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INTRODUCTION 
 
While privacy laws differ in their scope, focus, and approach, 
they all involve restrictions on the collection, use, sharing, or 
retention of information about people. In general, privacy laws 
reflect a societal consensus that privacy violations can lead to a wide 
range of financial, reputational, dignitary, and other harms, and that 
excessive collection and harmful uses of personal information 
should therefore be constrained. These laws require organizations to 
comply with a number of obligations concerning personal 
information.1 In practice, these requirements can lead organizations 
to refrain from collecting certain data, only use data with the consent 
of the individual, or to delete data after a certain timeframe or at the 
request of the individual. Further, the global trend is toward both 
more and stricter privacy laws.   
At the same time, scientific research is increasingly using the 
tools of data analytics and machine learning. These tools rely on 
“big data” and the idea that powerful computers and sophisticated 
analytical tools can examine very large data sets to reveal new 
insights and discoveries. Scientists believe this data-driven approach 
to research will lead to stunning breakthroughs in medicine, 
education, and many other fields that can dramatically advance 
human knowledge and well-being.   
The tension between these two trends is clear. Most privacy laws 
acknowledge and address that tension. While privacy laws aim to 
restrict harmful data practices, they typically also are designed to 
allow for, or even encourage, uses of personal information that are 
beneficial and valuable to the individual or society. The inherent 
tension is often resolved by including reasonable exceptions in the 
laws to allow for necessary or beneficial data uses. But these 
                                                                                                             
1 For the sake of consistency, this article generally uses the term “personal 
information.” Some of the laws it discusses use variations on that term, including 
“personally identifiable information” or “personal data,” and those alternatives 
terms may be used when referring to a specific law. 
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exceptions are not complete exemptions from privacy obligations; 
even such beneficial uses of personal information typically remain 
subject to other protections in privacy laws such as an obligation to 
maintain the security of the data.  
Protecting individual privacy is an important part of any use of 
personal information for research purposes. Organizations that 
collect, retain, use, or share personal information to advance 
scientific research should always handle that information with care, 
protect it from inadvertent disclosure or misuse, and be transparent 
about the use and protection of that data. But if privacy laws do not 
take into account and make allowances for the beneficial uses of 
personal information for research, the advancement of science, the 
expansion of knowledge, and the realization of new discoveries can 
be seriously impaired. 
This article addresses how privacy laws can and should allow 
for scientific research while still providing meaningful protections 
for personal information. Part I discuses key principles found in 
many privacy laws and how each can potentially impact scientific 
research. Part II describes several prominent privacy laws across 
different jurisdictions and how each addresses research as a type of 
data use. Part III briefly discusses the distinction between academic 
or public-interest research and commercial research. Finally, Part IV 
provides specific recommendations to lawmakers and regulators on 
how privacy law should address and accommodate scientific 
research.   
 
PART I:  HOW PRIVACY LAW PRINCIPLES AFFECT RESEARCH 
 
Privacy laws around the world reflect a common set of 
principles, frequently referred to as “fair information practice 
principles” or FIPPs. While there are different iterations of the 
FIPPs,2 they generally include the concepts of transparency, data 
                                                                                                             
2 See, e.g., U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), 
Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens (1973), at 41, 
https://www.justice.gov/opcl/docs/rec-com-rights.pdf; OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980),  
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecd 
guidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm); 
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minimization, choice or consent, data access, and data security.  
Some or all of these principles are found in virtually every privacy 
law. A number of privacy laws have expanded on these core 
principles. Some have incorporated a right to data deletion as an 
extension of the right to data access.3 Others have addressed the idea 
of de-identification as an extension of the principles of data 
minimization and data security.4   
Some of these principles and the resulting legal obligations have 
little negative impact on the use and sharing of personal information 
for research purposes. Transparency and data security are prime 
examples, and applying them to the context of research makes good 
sense and provides important protections for personal information 
as it is being used for research purposes. However, other principles, 
such as consent and data deletion, can create significant obstacles to 
scientific research if not drafted with sensible exceptions. The 
following discussion addresses each of these principles in turn. 
 
A.  Transparency 
 
Nearly every privacy law includes some type of transparency 
obligation.  Often, laws set out specific notice obligations and list 
the types of information that must be disclosed to individuals from 
whom personal information is collected. Depending on the 
applicable law, required disclosures may include descriptions of: 
 the categories of personal information collected,5 
                                                                                                             
U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Privacy Online: A Report to Congress 
(1998), at 7, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf); Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), Privacy Framework (2005), 
https://www.apec.org/-/media/APEC/Publications/2005/12/APEC-Privacy-
Framework/05_ecsg_privacyframewk.pdf).  
3 See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 312.6(a)(2) (2019) (right of a parent to request deletion 
of personal information collected from a child); Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 
17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 43 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR] (right of erasure). 
4 See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 3 at 33 (definition of pseudonymisation); CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 1798.140(h) (definition of deidentified). 
5 California Business and Professions Code § 22575(b); GDPR, supra note 3 
at 41, 43. 
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 the sources of personal information collected,6 
 the intended uses of personal information,7 
 the categories of third parties to whom personal information 
is disclosed,8 
 how long the personal information is retained,9 and 
 a description of the rights that individuals have with respect 
to personal information, such as the right to access.10 
These privacy notice disclosures are required whether or not 
personal information is used or shared for research purposes. An 
organization that intends to use or share data for research merely 
needs to state this intention in its privacy statement. Specifically, 
“research” should be included as one of the categories of data use, 
and academics and other researchers should be included among the 
categories of third parties to whom personal information is 
disclosed.   
With regard to data retention, it is generally sufficient to 
describe the criteria used to determine retention timeframes, rather 
than necessarily having to list specific retention schedules in a 
privacy notice.11 So, it may be useful to state one of the criteria as 
the period necessary to carry out legitimate scientific research. 
Requiring organizations to be transparent about their use and 
sharing of personal information, including sharing information with 
researchers, is an important privacy protection and can promote 
greater accountability.12  But these requirements do not themselves 
create any significant barrier to research. At most, they require 
organizations to consider and include research uses of data in the 
types of data use and sharing described in the organization’s privacy 
statement.  
 
                                                                                                             
6 GDPR, supra note 3 at 42, 43. 
7 GDPR, supra note 3 at 40, 41, 43. 
8 California Business and Professions Code § 22575(b); GDPR, supra note 3 
at 41, 43. 
9 GDPR, supra note 3 at 41, 42, 43. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 See generally Michael Hintze, In Defense of the Long Privacy Statement, 
76 MD. L. REV. 1044 (2017). 
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B.  Consent or choice 
 
Many privacy laws require consent to collect, use, or share 
personal information. Depending on how the law is drafted, 
interpreted, and enforced, the required consent may be either 
explicit, such as requiring an affirmative opt-in choice, or implicit, 
implying consent based on a failure to opt-out or on some other 
basis. Implicit consent may be a fairly low bar. For example, it may 
be achieved merely by informing individuals of a particular data use 
and implying consent based on their continued use of a product or 
service. Increasingly, privacy laws are raising the bar for adequate 
consent, requiring explicit consent in some cases.  However, 
obtaining explicit consent can be difficult; and in research, big data 
analytics, and machine learning scenarios, obtaining explicit 
consent may be impractical or impossible.  
Furthermore, there is strong evidence that seeking and obtaining 
consent to have personal information included in a research study 
can result in a biased data sample and affect the outcome of the 
research.13 An opt-in or explicit consent requirement is very likely 
to result in a non-representative sample and therefore bias the results 
of the research. But in many cases, even providing the ability to opt-
out could significantly affect the data in undesirable ways.   
Separate from the concerns regarding consent bias, researchers 
have also raised concerns that stringent requirements to obtain 
consent for accessing data for research purposes can lead to 
insufficient sample sizes, delay, and other costs that can interfere 
with efforts to produce timely and useful research results.14 
Thus, the potential for consent requirements to negatively affect 
scientific research is quite high. Fortunately, as described in Part II, 
many privacy laws provide exceptions or alternatives to consent 
when it comes to using data for research.   
                                                                                                             
13 See Khaled El Emam et al., A Review of Evidence on Consent Bias in 
Research, 13 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS, 42 (2013), 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15265161.2013.767958; Michelle 
E. Kho et al., Written Informed Consent and Selection Bias in Observational 
Studies Using Medical Records: Systematic Review, BMJ 338:b866 (March 12, 
2009), https://doi.org/10.1136bmj.b866. 
14 See, e.g., Douglas B. McCarthy et al., Medical Records and Privacy: 
Empirical Effects of Legislation, 34 HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 417 (April 
1999). 
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C.  Right to Access 
 
Another principle that is commonly reflected in privacy laws is 
an individual’s right to access personal information about them 
being held by an organization. This right is closely related to the 
principle of transparency, as it enables an individual to learn not just 
what personal information the organization collects in general, but 
to know specifically what personal information the organization has. 
But because the right of access can result in specific information 
about an individual being released, it is important that the 
organization be able to authenticate and verify that the person 
making the request is the correct person to whom the data relates. 
The right of access typically would not directly interfere with 
research uses of data, so the potential impact is relatively low. But 
like other privacy principles, it can add compliance obligations and 
resulting costs and overhead; organizations that use or share 
personal information for research purposes must take this into 
account. 
For instance, while some examples of the right to access are 
limited to accessing the personal information itself, others give 
individuals the right to obtain other details, such as the third parties 
with whom personal information is shared. Under most privacy laws 
that include such requirements, limiting that disclosure to the 
categories of third parties will suffice.15 In such cases, it will be 
quite easy for organizations that share personal information for 
research purposes to add “academic researchers” to their list of 
third-party recipients of personal information. This is similar to what 
should be done to meet transparency obligations.   
But a few laws may require more granular disclosures to 
individuals who make an access requests, at least under certain 
circumstances. For example, under the newly-enacted California 
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), if the sharing of personal 
information with a researcher could be characterized as a “sale,” a 
response to an access request may need to be more specific. Rather 
than just stating a category of third-party recipients, the response to 
                                                                                                             
15 See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 3 at 43 (“[T]he recipients or categories of 
recipient to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed”). 
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the access request would need to be clear about whether or not 
personal information about the specific requesting individual has 
been shared with researchers, and/or identify the specific third 
parties that have received the individual’s personal information.16 
Thus, organizations subject to such requirements should track and 
documents whose information is shared for research purposes and 
which third-party researchers or research organizations have 
received it, and be able to produce that data upon request. 
Finally, because an individual’s right to access can be asserted 
against recipients of personal information in many cases, 
researchers receiving the data could be subject to access requests. 
These data–receiving organizations should be prepared to respond 
to access requests under the applicable laws. 
 
D.  Right to delete 
 
While less common than a right to access, an increasing number 
of privacy laws have added a right to delete, enabling individuals to 
request that organizations delete personal information about them.17 
Similar to the potential problems described relating to consent, an 
unchecked right to delete can create serious barriers to research. 
As with consent, enabling individuals to selectively remove 
themselves from research by deleting their personal information can 
cause bias in the data sample, lead to smaller sample sizes, and 
impose additional costs and burdens on research. 
For example, if a study is underway and one or more individuals 
demand removal of their personal information that is part of that 
study, that research could be derailed.  Further, even if the deletion 
could be delayed until the completion of the study, it could still harm 
scientific research. A hallmark of good science is that results be 
testable and replicable. However, if individuals are able to later 
                                                                                                             
16 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.115(a)(2) (“The categories of personal information 
that the business sold about the consumer and the categories of third parties to 
whom the personal information was sold, by category or categories of personal 
information for each third party to whom the personal information was sold.”) 
(emphasis added). 
17 GDPR, supra note 3 at 43-44 (EU); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105 (California 
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018); 34 C.F.R. § 312.6(a)(2), 78 Fed. Reg. 4,012 
(January 17, 2013) (giving parents the right to request deletion of personal 
information collected online from children under the age of thirteen). 
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remove their personal information from a data set that underlies a 
study, the ability to test and replicate that study could be 
significantly undermined. 
Most privacy laws that include a right to delete include a number 
of exceptions, including where the data is needed for research. Such 
exceptions are essential to enable beneficial uses of personal 
information for scientific research.   
 
E.  Data Minimization 
 
Data minimization is a somewhat amorphous principle that 
encompasses several ideas. One aspect of data minimization is the 
idea of collection limitation—don’t collect more personal 
information than is reasonably needed to accomplish the purpose(s) 
for which it is collected. Another aspect is retention limitation—
don’t keep data longer than is reasonably needed to accomplish the 
purpose(s) for which it was collected. A related concept is that data 
can and should be made less sensitive through techniques such as 
de-identification (e.g., removing, masking, or altering data elements 
that can identify an individual) or reducing the precision of data 
(such as converting a precise GPS location point to zip-code level 
data). 
Many privacy laws include some notion of data minimization.18  
This principle creates obvious tensions with the big data analytics 
and machine learning that underlie much scientific research today. 
The promise of big data is that applying massive computing power 
to very large data sets can reveal unexpected patterns, correlations, 
and connections within the data and result in surprising new insights 
and discoveries. At least in theory, the more data the researchers 
have, the more unanticipated breakthroughs are likely to emerge. 
The combination of the ideas that “more data is better” and that the 
outcomes are unknowable until the research occurs make it difficult 
to apply legal principles that suggest less data is better and that the 
purposes of the data should be established up front.   
But this is a tension, not necessarily a conflict. As with the 
transparency principle, it is important to articulate up front, at least 
                                                                                                             
18 GDPR, supra note 3, arts. 5(1)(c) (collection limitation), 5(1)(e) (retention 
limitation) at 35-36 (EU); 34 C.F.R. § 312.7 (collection limitation), § 312.10 
(retention limitation), 78 Fed. Reg. 4,012 (January 17, 2013). 
9
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in general terms, that research is one of the anticipated purposes for 
the data. By establishing this purpose at the outset, the amount of 
data collected, the length of retention, and the level of precision and 
identifiability maintained can take the anticipated research purposes 
into account. Beyond that, organizations should still be thoughtful 
about the data they collect and retain. If data is stale or unreliable, 
and as a result very unlikely to be useful for research, it should not 
be retained. If some level of de-identification is compatible with the 
research uses of the personal information, the compatible de-
identification should be employed.   
As with other aspects of data protection, data minimization can 
be thought of as a risk reduction principle and should be considered 
carefully along with other compliance measures.  It is likely 
inevitable that any application of data minimization could 
potentially have some negative impact on research, but if carefully 
employed, an appropriate balance can be found and those impacts 
may be limited to the margins. To enable that balance, data 
minimization should be reflected in privacy laws as a flexible 
concept that can allow for broad use of data for scientific research. 
 
F.  Data Security 
 
Another common element among privacy laws is an obligation 
to implement appropriate data security measures.19 Typically (and 
ideally), data security obligations are drafted to create a flexible set 
of requirements that are not overly proscriptive and take into 
account the context, nature, and sensitivity of the personal 
information in question. 
Responsible organizations that handle large amounts of personal 
information typically invest heavily in data security for their core 
systems, such as firewalls, access controls, encryption, and intrusion 
detection. But research uses of data may involve moving data into 
different systems in a different environment such as a university or 
a research lab. When using or sharing personal information for 
                                                                                                             
19 GDPR, supra note 3 at 51-52 (EU); Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Public Law 104-191 (Security Rule at 45 
C.F.R. Part 160 and Subparts A and C of Part 164); 34 C.F.R. § 312.8, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 4,012 (January 17, 2013). 
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research purposes, it is important to ensure that all systems on which 
the data is stored maintain the appropriate level of data security.  
Doing so may require the performance of due diligence to ensure the 
destinations systems are secure, and if those systems fall short, there 
will likely be additional costs incurred from upgrading existing 
security protections or finding alternative data storage 
arrangements. But those are steps that should be taken in any case, 
and the costs are likely to pale in comparison to the costs of a 
security breach affecting personal information.   
Thus, while data security requirements can create costs, those 
costs should be seen as prudent investments, and the requirements 
do not themselves create a legal barrier to using or sharing data for 
research purposes. They are an appropriate and important part of any 
privacy law. 
 
G.  De-identification 
 
De-identification is a process by which personal information is 
manipulated in ways designed to make it more difficult to 
subsequently re-identify an individual from that data. It can involve 
a wide range of techniques. And there is a range of resulting 
strengths of de-identification, from relatively weak methods where 
the risk of re-identification is high, to very strong methods where 
the data can be considered irreversibly anonymized. 
De-identification is relevant for compliance with nearly every 
privacy law. In some cases, de-identification is not explicitly 
mentioned, but it is implicit in the scope of the law. Most privacy 
laws are scoped to a defined set of “personal information.” And if 
data can be strongly de-identified to the extent it no longer meets the 
law’s definition of personal information, it will almost always fall 
outside the scope of the privacy law. As a result, research on 
strongly de-identified data can typically proceed without further 
privacy compliance obligations.   
A number of privacy laws explicitly incorporate notions of de-
identification as a way to meet some or all of the law’s requirements. 
For instance, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule includes a detailed set of criteria 
regarding de-identification that enable de-identified data to fall 
11
Hintze: Science and Privacy: Data Protection Laws and Their Impact on Res
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2019
114 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 
14:2 
outside the scope of the Rule.20 In Europe, the GDPR recognizes a 
range of de-identification methods and strengths and provides 
regulatory incentives for different levels of de-identification.21 
But while de-identification is included in a number of privacy 
laws, none have a blanket requirement that data be de-identified. 
Such a blanket rule would be unworkable, because there are many 
contexts in which de-identification of data would be incompatible 
with the intended uses of the data. And as a general rule, the stronger 
the de-identification, the lower the utility of the data. With some 
research, de-identification can be a practical and advisable option, 
but not in all cases. 
Rather than absolute rules, privacy laws typically create 
incentives to de-identify data, and thereby encourage the use of 
techniques that can reduce risk in context where de-identification is 
a practical option. When properly drafted, these laws can encourage 
best practices to reduce privacy risks, while not imposing barriers to 
scientific research.  
 
H.  Summary 
 
The following chart summarizes the likelihood of negative 
impacts on scientific research for each of these principles. 
 
Principle Likelihood of Negative 
Impact 
Transparency Low 
Consent or choice High 
Right to access Low 
Right to delete High 
Data minimization Medium 
Data security Low 
                                                                                                             
20 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a)–(b) (2018). 
21 GDPR, supra note 3, Recital 26 at 5 (EU) (discussing concepts of personal 
data and anonymous data); id. arts. 4(1) (definition of personal data), 4(5) 
(definition of pseudonymization) at 33; id. art. 11 (processing which does not 
require identification) at 39. See Michael Hintze, Viewing the GDPR through a 
De-Identification Lens: A Tool for Compliance, Clarification, and Consistency, 8 
INT’L DATA PROTECTION L. 86 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2909121. 
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De-identification Low 
 
PART II:  HOW EXISTING PRIVACY LAWS TREAT RESEARCH 
 
As suggested in Part I above, different privacy laws treat 
research uses of personal information differently. Some address 
research in a thoughtful and flexible manner, creating appropriate 
exceptions for research that allow and encourage scientific research 
to flourish.  Others, either by design or oversight, have been less 
friendly to research.  In this Part, several prominent privacy laws are 
examined in terms of how they treat scientific research. 
 
A.  Europe: General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
 
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is a 
comprehensive privacy law that applies across the European Union 
(EU) and the European Economic Area (EEA).  It also has been 
highly influential globally, with countries around the world adopting 
privacy laws based on the European model.   
The GDPR incorporates the full range of principles discussed in 
Part I of this article, including data minimization, consent, and 
deletion rights, all of which can cause problems for beneficial 
research uses of personal data. However, the drafters of the GDPR 
included thoughtful exceptions and allowances for research that 
enable personal data to be used and shared for such purposes without 
serious impediment.    
Consent is addressed in the GDPR in a unique way.  The law 
sets a very high bar for consent. Under the GDPR, consent must be 
“freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous” and manifested 
through “a statement or by a clear affirmative action” indicating the 
data subject’s agreement.22 Obviously, obtaining such consent 
would create a significant barrier for research uses of personal data. 
However, consent is not always required.  Rather, under the GDPR, 
processing personal data requires a legal basis.23 There are several 
different legal bases available under the law, only one of which is 
                                                                                                             
22 GDPR, supra note 3 at 34 (EU). 
23 Id. art. 6 at 36. 
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the consent of the data subject.24 Other common legal bases include 
where the processing is “necessary for the performance of a contract 
to which the data subject is party,”25 or if the “legitimate interests” 
of the data controller or a third party outweighs the interests or rights 
of the data subject.26   
Further, the GDPR specifies that if there is a legal basis for the 
original purpose of collecting the personal data, a secondary use of 
that data need not have a separate legal basis if that use is 
“compatible” with the purpose for which the data was collected.  
Recital 50 of the GDPR helpfully notes that scientific research is 
such a compatible purpose:  
 
The processing of personal data for purposes other than 
those for which the personal data were initially collected 
should be allowed only where the processing is compatible 
with the purposes for which the personal data were initially 
collected. In such a case, no legal basis separate from that 
which allowed the collection of the personal data is required 
. . . . Further processing for archiving purposes in the public 
interest, scientific or historical research purposes or 
statistical purposes should be considered to be compatible 
lawful processing operations.27 
 
This language is reflected in Article 5 which provides that: 
 
[Personal data shall be] collected for specified, explicit and 
legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner 
that is incompatible with those purposes; further processing 
for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or 
historical research purposes or statistical purposes shall, in 
accordance with Article 89(1), not be considered to be 
incompatible with the initial purposes (‘purpose 
limitation’).28 
 
                                                                                                             
24 Id. art. 6(1)(a) at. 36. 
25 Id. art. 6(1)(b) at 36. 
26 Id. art. 6(1)(f) at 36. 
27 Id. Recital 50 at 9. 
28 Id. art. 5(1)(b) at 35. 
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The reference to Article 89(1) suggests that there are certain 
conditions that must be met in order for scientific research to be 
considered a compatible purpose, requiring no additional legal basis.  
Those conditions come down to there being “appropriate 
safeguards” in place designed to protect privacy and individual 
rights:  
 
Processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, 
scientific or historical research purposes or statistical 
purposes, shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, in 
accordance with this Regulation, for the rights and freedoms 
of the data subject. Those safeguards shall ensure that 
technical and organisational measures are in place in 
particular in order to ensure respect for the principle of data 
minimisation. Those measures may include 
pseudonymisation provided that those purposes can be 
fulfilled in that manner. Where those purposes can be 
fulfilled by further processing which does not permit or no 
longer permits the identification of data subjects, those 
purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner.29 
 
Likewise, Article 6(4) re-iterates the need for “appropriate 
safeguards” where the secondary use is based on the use being 
“compatible” with the original purpose of collection:  
 
Where the processing for a purpose other than that for which 
the personal data have been collected is not based on the data 
subject's consent [or a legal requirement], the controller 
shall, in order to ascertain whether processing for another 
purpose is compatible with the purpose for which the 
personal data are initially collected, take into account, inter 
alia . . . the possible consequences of the intended further 
processing for data subjects [and] the existence of 
appropriate safeguards, which may include encryption or 
pseudonymisation.30 
 
                                                                                                             
29 Id. art. 89(1) at 84. 
30 Id. art. 6(4) at 37. 
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There are conflicting readings of some of the relevant provisions 
cited above, particularly with respect to scenarios where the original 
legal basis for collecting and using the data was the consent of the 
data subject.  One potential issue arises from the fact that where the 
original legal basis is consent, the GDPR gives the data subject the 
right to withdraw consent;31 if this right is exercised, the 
compatibility analysis may no longer be available. However, the 
withdrawal of consent is not retroactive, so at most it would affect 
only future research that commences after the withdrawal of consent 
for the original purpose. The European Commission published brief 
(and non-binding) guidance that goes even further, suggesting that 
the compatibility analysis for secondary uses of data is never 
allowed where the original legal basis is consent,32 however that 
conclusion appears to be based on a misreading of Article 6(4), 
quoted above.33   
                                                                                                             
31 Id. art. 7(3) at 37. 
32 See Eur. Comm’n, Can We Use Data for Another Purpose?, 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rules-business-
and-organisations/principles-gdpr/purpose-data-processing/can-we-use-data-
another-purpose_en (last visited Apr. 14, 2019) (“If your company/organisation 
has collected data on the basis of legitimate interest, a contract or vital 
interests it can be used for another purpose but only after checking that the new 
purpose is compatible with the original purpose. . . . If your 
company/organisation has collected the data on the basis of consent or following 
a legal requirement, no further processing beyond what is covered by the original 
consent or the provisions of the law is possible. Further processing would require 
obtaining new consent or a new legal basis.”). 
33 Article 6(4) is a long sentence and a bit difficult to parse on an initial 
reading.  But the subject of the sentence is “processing for a purpose other than 
that for which the personal data have been collected” – in other words a 
“secondary purpose.”  So that provision says, in effect, “Where [a secondary 
purpose] is not based on [consent or a legal requirement], the controller shall, in 
order to ascertain whether [the secondary purpose] is compatible with the 
[primary purpose], take into account . . .”  In other words, unless the secondary 
purpose has a legal basis of consent or is a legal requirement, it is necessary to do 
the compatibility analysis.  Conversely, if a secondary use is based on consent or 
a legal requirement, it is not necessary to do a compatibility analysis.  That 
conclusion makes sense and reflects a sound policy.  Conversely, Article 6(4) does 
not appear to say, as the Commission guidance seems to suggest, that if the 
collection and primary use is based on consent or a legal requirement, the 
compatibility analysis is unavailable or irrelevant, and any secondary use is 
prohibited unless there is a separate legal basis.  Such a surprising conclusion does 
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Regardless, even if a separate legal basis is required for a 
secondary research use of personal data, the GDPR also offers a 
practical solution with the availability of “legitimate interests” as a 
legal basis. This legal basis is available where the “processing is 
necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the 
controller or by a third party, except where such interests are 
overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of 
the data subject which require protection of personal data.”34 Thus, 
relying on the legitimate interests basis for scientific research 
requires balancing the benefits and interests in doing the research 
against the risks to the rights and freedoms of the individual. The 
benefits side of the equation is not limited to the interests of the 
organizations using or sharing the personal information for research 
purposes, but can also take into account the interests of any third 
party—including the public interest and benefits of the research.  
And on the risk side of the equation, unlike uses of data that directly 
impact the data subject, such as marketing, advertising, 
personalization, or other individualized decision-making, research 
typically does not have a direct impact on the individual data 
subjects. Moreover, if additional privacy protections are in place, 
such as the “appropriate safeguards” noted above, the balancing test 
will almost always come out in favor of being able to rely on 
legitimate interests as a legal basis for using personal data to conduct 
scientific research.  
Based on these provisions, scientific research is almost certain 
to be considered a purpose “compatible” with the purpose(s) for 
which the data was originally collected, requiring no additional legal 
basis. To the extent that an additional legal basis may be needed, 
scientific research is almost certain to be eligible for the legitimate 
interests basis. Both of those approaches, however, require that 
appropriate safeguards be in place to protect the privacy and rights 
of the individuals whose personal data is being used.  
The references to “appropriate safeguards” include de-
identification as a key example of the measures organizations 
engaged in research can take to protect privacy and the rights of the 
data subjects. But it is not a mandate. Rather, de-identification need 
                                                                                                             
not seem to be supported by the text of the law. 
34 GDPR, supra note 3 at 36. 
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only be applied to the extent compatible with the research needs. 
But if de-identification would reduce the utility of the data for the 
intended research purpose, it need not be applied (but other 
safeguards, such as strong security, should be in place). In any case, 
the organizations involved in research need to demonstrate that they 
have applied “appropriate safeguards” and that the likelihood of 
negative consequences on the data subject is low.   
The GDPR also includes data minimization principles, including 
retention limitations which may be in tension with the idea that 
researchers need to gather and retain large volumes of data to 
conduct big data analytics tools and machine learning. However, the 
retention limitation principle in the GDPR includes a specific carve-
out for research: 
 
Personal data shall be: . . . kept in a form which permits 
identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary 
for the purposes for which the personal data are processed; 
personal data may be stored for longer periods insofar as the 
personal data will be processed solely for archiving purposes 
in the public interest, scientific or historical research 
purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with Article 
89(1) subject to implementation of the appropriate technical 
and organisational measures required by this Regulation in 
order to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data 
subject.35 
 
Finally, the GDPR provides for a limited right for individuals to 
request the deletion of personal data.36 But that right only applies 
under certain specified instances. One instance is when the data 
subject withdraws consent and there is no other legal ground for 
processing.37 Thus, if the research is based on the consent of the data 
subject (or if it is based on being compatible with the original 
purpose of collection, which was based on the consent of the data 
subject), and the data subject subsequently withdraws that consent, 
the data subject may have a right to have the data deleted. However, 
the right to delete in that case would apply only if there is no other 
                                                                                                             
35 Id. art. 5(1)(e) at 36. 
36 Id. art. 17 at 43. 
37 Id. art. 17(1)(b) at 44. 
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legal basis for continued processing. As discussed above, scientific 
research is very likely to have a separate legal basis of legitimate 
interests. But more importantly, the exceptions to the right of erasure 
specifically reference research uses of data: 
 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the extent that 
processing is necessary: . . . (d) for archiving purposes in the 
public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or 
statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) in so far 
as the right referred to in paragraph 1 is likely to render 
impossible or seriously impair the achievement of the 
objectives of that processing.38 
 
Thus, while research uses of personal data do not create an 
absolute exception to the right of erasure, a data processor can refuse 
an erasure request following a withdrawal of consent if it can either 
(1) establish an alternate legal basis, such as legitimate interests, or 
(2) demonstrate that deletion of the data related to the data subject 
will seriously impair the research objective.   
Thus, while the GDPR includes principles such as consent, data 
minimization, and a right to delete that can potentially impede 
research uses of data, it also provides flexibility and exceptions that 
should allow research to flourish. Where obtaining explicit consent 
from each individual data subject is often impractical and could 
undermine the statistical validity of outcomes, the GDPR provides 
practical alternatives to consent. Data controllers conducting 
research on data have a strong case under the GDPR for relying on 
a legal basis other than consent, such as legitimate interests. 
Alternatively, data controllers need not have an additional legal 
basis at all if the secondary purpose is “compatible” with the original 
purpose of collection, and the GDPR specifies that research is a 
compatible purpose. And research is called out explicitly as an 
exception to retention limitation and the right to delete.    
 
B.  Canada: Personal Information Protection and Electronic 
Documents Act (PIPEDA) 
 
                                                                                                             
38 Id. art. 17(3) at 44. 
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In Canada, PIPEDA is another comprehensive privacy law that 
includes a range of principles including transparency, retention 
limitation, right of access, and data security. It generally requires 
notice and consent for uses and disclosures of personal 
information.39 However, the law permits disclosures of personal 
information for “scholarly study or research” without notice or 
consent if: 
 
 the purposes cannot be achieved without the use or 
disclosure of the information,  
 it is impracticable to obtain consent, and  
 the organization provides prior notice to the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada.40 
 
The exemption from consent requirements for research is 
common in privacy laws, but the requirement to inform the regulator 
when an organization seeks to use that exemption is unique to 
PIPEDA. 
The retention limitation principle in PIPEDA is tied to the 
transparency principle.  It provides that “[p]ersonal information that 
is no longer required to fulfil the identified purposes should be 
destroyed, erased, or made anonymous.”41 Thus, if research is one 
of the identified purposes, the retention limitation provision should 
allow for the retention of data for as long as needed for research. 
 
C.  United States: Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) 
 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule applies to protected health 
information (PHI), and provides detailed regulations reflecting a 
broad range of principles.  It also specifically addresses the use and 
                                                                                                             
39 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, 
c 5 sch 1 cl 4.3 (Can.). 
40 Id. s 7(3)(f);  see also id. s 7(2)(c) (outlining a similar exception to notice 
and consent for uses of personal information for research purposes, which 
includes the same three conditions that apply to disclosures, plus that the 
information be “used in a manner that will ensure its confidentiality.”). 
41 Id. sch 1 cl 4.5.3. 
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disclosure of PHI for research purposes.42   
The HIPAA Privacy Rule defines research fairly broadly as “a 
systematic investigation, including research development, testing, 
and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable 
knowledge.”43 Notably, it does not limit research to medical or 
health research. 
PHI can be used for research purposes under several different 
circumstances. First, if the data to be used for research meets the 
HIPAA standards for de-identification (based either on the safe 
harbor method or the expert determination method), then the data is 
no longer PHI subject to the Privacy Rule and it can be freely 
disclosed for research (or any other) purposes.44 
Second, PHI can be used or disclosed for research purposes with 
the individual’s authorization (i.e. with consent).45 
Third, PHI can be used or disclosed for research purposes 
without the individual’s authorization if there is a documented 
waiver approved by an Institutional Review Board (IRB) or Privacy 
Board.46 The IRB or Privacy Board can be that of the covered entity 
making the disclosure of PHI, the recipient researcher, or an 
independent board.47   
Fourth, limited sets of PHI (which means that certain direct 
identifiers have been removed, although the data is not fully de-
identified as defined by the Rule) can be disclosed to a researcher 
                                                                                                             
42 A useful overview of how HIPAA addresses research uses of personal 
information can be found at: https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/special-topics/research/index.html.  
43 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2018). 
44 Id. § 164.514(a)-(c). 
45 See generally id. § 164.508 (regarding individual authorization for uses or 
disclosures of PHI); id. § 164.508(b)(3)(i) (permitting authorization for research 
purposes to be combined under certain circumstances); id. § 508(b)(4)(1) 
(allowing a covered health care provider to “condition the provision of research-
related treatment on provision of an authorization for the use or disclosure of 
protected health information for such research.”). 
46 Id. § 164.512(i)(1). 
47 See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., HIPAA FAQs for Professionals, 
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/310/does-hipaa-require-a-
covered-entity-to-create-an-irb-or-privacy-board/index.html (last visited Apr. 14, 
2019).  
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pursuant to a data use agreement.48 
Additionally, the HIPAA Privacy Rule also allows the use and 
disclosures of PHI of decedents for research purposes.49 The Rule 
also allows for researchers to access PHI (including remote access) 
for purposes that are preparatory to research (such as designing a 
study or preparing a research protocol).50  
Finally, certain disclosures of PHI for research purposes are 
subject to an individual’s right to receive an accounting of such 
disclosures that occurred over the last six years. Thus, covered 
entities must ensure that such disclosures are well-documented in a 
way that would enable them to respond to these types of requests 
from individuals.  
The level of specific detail regarding research uses and 
disclosures of data in HIPAA is well beyond that found in any other 
privacy law. Despite the rigor of these requirements, and the 
sensitivity of the personal information involved, they provide 
significant flexibility to enable scientific research. As a result, some 
elements of the HIPAA privacy rule may be useful to consider in 
using personal information for research beyond the health context.   
 
D.  United States: Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERPA) 
 
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act is a U.S. federal 
law that applies to schools that receive federal funding.51 It includes 
several privacy principles that apply to student records. FERPA 
gives parents (and students who are 18 years old or over) the right 
to access student records, and it requires their consent for certain 
disclosures of educational records.  
However, consent is not always required. Under FERPA, 
                                                                                                             
48 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e) (2018). Templates for such data use agreements are 
available from various sources. For example, the Health Care Systems Research 
Network (HCSRN) has published a tool kit and templates for data use agreements 
at http://www.hcsrn.org/en/Tools%20&%20Materials/GrantsContracting/.  
49 Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(iii). 
50 Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(ii). 
51 Useful information and resources related to FERPA can be found at 
https://ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/ and https://ferpasherpa.org/.  
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schools and other educational institutions can disclose personal 
information related to students for research purposes under any of 
the following conditions: 
 With the consent of the parent—or the consent of the student 
if the student is 18 years old (or older) or attending a post-
secondary education institution.52 
 The personally identifiable information is limited to 
“directory information.”53 
 The personally identifiable information is de-identified 
through the “removal of all personally identifiable 
information” and a “reasonable determination” that no 
student is identifiable from the data alone or in combination 
with “other reasonably available information.”54 
 The personally identifiable information is de-identified 
through key-coding (i.e. a reversable method of de-
identification) if the purpose of the research is “education 
research.”55  
 The disclosure to a third-party organization conducting 
studies, on behalf of educational agencies or institutions and 
pursuant to a written agreement, designed to (A) develop, 
validate, or administer predictive tests; (B) administer 
student aid programs; or (C) improve instruction.56 
The written agreement required for the “studies exception” must 
include certain specific terms as follows: 
 
(1) Specifies the purpose, scope, and duration of the study 
                                                                                                             
52 34 C.F.R. § 99.30 (2018). 
53 Id. §§ 99.31(a)(11), 99.37. “‘Directory information’ means information 
contained in an education record of a student that would not generally be 
considered harmful or an invasion of privacy if disclosed. . . . Directory 
information includes, but is not limited to, the student's name; address; telephone 
listing; electronic mail address; photograph; date and place of birth; major field 
of study; grade level; enrollment status (e.g., undergraduate or graduate, full-time 
or part-time); dates of attendance; participation in officially recognized activities 
and sports; weight and height of members of athletic teams; degrees, honors and 
awards received; and the most recent educational agency or institution attended.” 
34 C.F.R. § 99.3.  
54 Id. § 99.31(b)(1). 
55 Id. § 99.31(b)(2). 
56 Id. § 99.31(a)(6). 
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or studies and the information to be disclosed; 
(2) Requires the organization to use personally identifiable 
information from education records only to meet the 
purpose or purposes of the study as stated in the written 
agreement;  
(3) Requires the organization to conduct the study in a 
manner that does not permit personal identification of 
parents and students, as defined in this part, by anyone 
other than representatives of the organization with 
legitimate interests; and 
(4) Requires the organization to destroy or return to the 
educational agency or institution all personally 
identifiable information when the information is no 
longer needed for the purposes for which the study was 
conducted and specifies the time period in which the 
information must be returned or destroyed.57 
 
These exceptions to consent for certain research purposes under 
FERPA are narrower than a general research exception. Disclosures 
for “education research” purposes are given more favorable 
treatment. But research for other purposes can occur if, for example, 
the student records are strongly de-identified.  
 
E.  United States: Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA) 
 
COPPA is another U.S. federal privacy law that applies to 
personal information collected from children.58 It requires operators 
of online services to obtain verifiable parental consent prior to the 
online collection, use, or disclosure of personal information from 
children under the age of thirteen.59 It gives parents the right to 
access and delete children’s personal information.60 And it includes 
requirements for data minimization (collection limitations), 
                                                                                                             
57 Id. § 99.31(a)(6)(iii)(C). 
58 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (Pub.L. 105–277, 112 Stat. 2681-728, enacted 
October 21, 1998), implementing regulations at 16 C.F.R. Part 312. 
59 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(a) (2019), 78 Fed. Reg. 4,011 (January 17, 2013). 
60 Id. § 312.6, at 4,012. 
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transparency, and reasonable security procedures.61 COPPA is 
unusual among privacy laws in that it does not have any particular 
carve-out for uses and/or disclosures of personal information for 
research purposes.   
Prior to 2013, the impact of COPPA on research would have 
been lower due to the fact that it had a relatively narrow definition 
of “personal information.”62 Thus, through reasonable de-
identification, data could be taken outside the scope of personal 
information as defined by COPPA, and therefore no longer 
subjected to its requirements, including parental consent and the 
right to delete. But through its rulemaking authority, the Federal 
Trade Commission expanded the definition of personal information 
in 2013 to include, among other data types, any persistent identifier 
“that can be used to recognize a user over time and across different 
website or online services;” “a photograph, video, or audio file, 
where such file contains a child’s image or voice;” and precise 
geolocation information.63 This broader definition of personal 
information means that it will be more difficult to de-identify the 
data such that it is no longer within the scope of the law.   
The rigor of the parental consent requirement under COPPA, 
and the lack of an exception for research, undoubtedly reflects the 
notion that higher levels of privacy protections are appropriate when 
it comes to young children. However, the downside of this approach 
is that it could impair scientific research that could benefit children.   
                                                                                                             
61 Id. § 312.7, at 4,012 (collection limitations), § 312.4, at 4,010 
(transparency), § 312.8, at 4,012 (security). 
62 “Personal information means individually identifiable information about 
an individual collected online, including: (a) A first and last name; (b) A home or 
other physical address including street name and name of a city or town; (c) An 
e-mail address or other online contact information, including but not limited to an 
instant messaging user identifier, or a screen name that reveals an individual’s e-
mail address; (d) A telephone number; (e) A Social Security number; (f) A 
persistent identifier, such as a customer number held in a cookie or a processor 
serial number, where such identifier is associated with individually identifiable 
information; or a combination of a last name or photograph of the individual with 
other information such that the combination permits physical or online contacting; 
or (g) Information concerning the child or the parents of that child that the operator 
collects online from the child and combines with an identifier described in this 
definition.” 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2019), 64 Fed. Reg. 59,912 (November 3, 1999). 
63 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2019), 78 Fed. Reg. 4,009 (January 17, 2013). 
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Organizations that wish to use or disclose personal information 
collected from children under the age of thirteen will have to obtain 
parental consent. Thus, research uses and disclosures should be 
included in the scope of consent obtained from parents with the 
original collection of the personal information.   
An additional complication with regard to getting consent for 
research purposes is that COPPA also includes a requirement that 
parents are offered the opportunity to provide consent to the 
collection and use of personal information, but not to the disclosure 
of such information.64 This “limited consent” option means that if 
an organization wishes to share with researchers the personal 
information collected from children under thirteen, it cannot 
combine the parental consent for such sharing with the parental 
consent for the original collection—or at least it must offer the 
parents to option to opt-out from the sharing of the personal 
information. 
 
F.  California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) 
 
The new California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) will come 
into effect on January 1, 2020. Many critics have raised concerns 
regarding the numerous ambiguities and inconsistencies in the law 
that have created great uncertainty about how the CCPA will be 
interpreted and enforced. There is some hope that the statute will be 
further amended to clarify certain aspects of the law or that the 
California Attorney General will develop regulations or guidelines 
that will increase clarity. Nevertheless, significant ambiguity is 
likely to remain for the foreseeable future, and despite those 
problems, companies need to take steps to attempt to come into 
compliance the best they can by the end of 2019.   
In contrast to the GDPR, the CCPA does not require consent or 
an alternate legal basis for all collection and use of personal 
information. Nor does it have a general data minimization 
obligation.  Instead, it is focused primarily on giving consumers the 
right to opt-out from “sales” of personal information,65 giving users 
                                                                                                             
64 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(a)(2) (2019). 
65 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120. 
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broad data access, correction, and deletion rights,66 and imposing 
additional transparency obligations on companies.67  Thus, there is 
no general obligation on companies to get consent or establish an 
alternative basis for sharing data with researchers—unless that 
sharing could be characterized as a “sale” of data.   
However, if the transfer of data for research purpose is 
considered a “sale” of personal information, that transfer will be 
highly regulated and the CCPA will impose a number of proscriptive 
obligations. The definition of “sale” is very broad and includes any 
transfer of data for “consideration” (which can be interpreted to 
cover many or most commercial transactions involving data 
transfers).68 The breadth of that definition puts at least some data 
sharing for research purposes at risk, particularly where a 
commercial entity is sharing data and expects to obtain some 
commercial benefit from the resulting research. Other sharing of 
personal information for research purposes would likely not cross 
the line into being a data “sale,” particularly if the sharing is with 
academic researchers and there is not a direct commercial benefit 
expected. Thus, the risk of the sharing being deemed a “sale” is a 
factor worth considering when making arrangements to share data 
for research purposes, and it may be worth explicitly stating in the 
data sharing agreement that no consideration is being provided for 
the transfer of the data. 
The CCPA also includes a right for individuals to request the 
deletion of personal information.69 The impact of this right is likely 
to be quite limited, however, because there are many exceptions 
such that companies will be able to decline a request to delete 
information in most cases. For instance, personal information can be 
retained, despite a deletion request from an individual, if the 
information is necessary to provide a service requested or 
reasonably anticipated by the individual,70 for security purposes,71 
                                                                                                             
66 Id. §§ 1798.105, 1798.110, 1798.115. 
67 Id. §§ 1798.100(b), 1798.105(b), 1798.110(c), 1798.115(c), 
1798.130(a)(5), 1798.135(a)(2). 
68 Id. § 1798.140(t). 
69 Id. § 1798.105. 
70 Id. § 1798.105(d)(1). 
71 Id. § 1798.105(d)(2). 
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or to use the data internally for purposes that are “reasonably aligned 
with the expectations of the consumer based on the consumer’s 
relationship with the business”72 or “compatible with the context in 
which the consumer provided the information.”73 It is hard to 
imagine a scenario in which a business couldn’t credibly claim that 
one or more of those exceptions apply. And if the personal 
information can be retained for one of those broad purposes, there is 
nothing in the CCPA preventing that retained information from also 
being used for research purposes.   
It is worth noting that in addition to those broad exceptions to 
the right to delete, there is also a very narrow exception that is 
specific to certain types of scientific research. But it is so narrow 
and confusingly drafted that it is less likely to be useful for research 
than the broader, more general exceptions. Specifically, the research 
exception to the right of deletion only applies to research that is: 
 
[P]ublic or peer-reviewed scientific, historical, or statistical 
research in the public interest that adheres to all other 
applicable ethics and privacy laws, when the businesses’ 
deletion of the information is likely to render impossible or 
seriously impair the achievement of such research, if the 
consumer has provided informed consent.74 
 
Further, “research” is a defined term under the CCPA, and the 
definition reinforces the idea that it must be for the public interest.  
And it also sets out several other (somewhat redundant) criteria, 
including that the research be for non-commercial purposes and that 
the data must be de-identified: 
 
“Research” means scientific, systematic study and 
observation, including basic research or applied research that 
is in the public interest and that adheres to all other 
applicable ethics and privacy laws or studies conducted in 
the public interest in the area of public health. Research with 
personal information that may have been collected from a 
consumer in the course of the consumer’s interactions with 
                                                                                                             
72 Id. § 1798.105(d)(7). 
73 Id. § 1798.105(d)(9). 
74 Id. § 1798.105(d)(6). 
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a business’s service or device for other purposes shall be:  
(1) Compatible with the business purpose for which the 
personal information was collected.  
(2) Subsequently pseudonymized and deidentified, or 
deidentified and in the aggregate, such that the information 
cannot reasonably identify, relate to, describe, be capable of 
being associated with, or be linked, directly or indirectly, to 
a particular consumer.  
(3) Made subject to technical safeguards that prohibit 
reidentification of the consumer to whom the information 
may pertain.  
(4) Subject to business processes that specifically 
prohibit reidentification of the information. 
(5) Made subject to business processes to prevent 
inadvertent release of deidentified information. 
(6) Protected from any reidentification attempts. 
(7) Used solely for research purposes that are compatible 
with the context in which the personal information was 
collected. 
(8) Not be used for any commercial purpose. 
(9) Subjected by the business conducting the research to 
additional security controls [that] limit access to the research 
data to only those individuals in a business as are necessary 
to carry out the research purpose.75 
 
There is significant ambiguity in this definition, indicative of the 
generally poor drafting of the CCPA.  For instance, in the sentence 
preceding the nine conditions included in the definition, the subject 
of that sentence is “research.” But several of the nine conditions that 
apply to that subject make little sense as a condition on research, but 
rather seem to have been drafted as a condition on “personal 
information.” For instance, requiring that personal information be 
de-identified makes sense, but that’s not what this definition 
requires. Instead, it says that the “research . . . shall 
be . . . subsequently pseudonymized and deidentified . . . [and] 
protected from any reidentification attempts.”76 Does this mean that 
                                                                                                             
75 Id. § 1798.140(s). 
76 Id. § 1798.140(s)(2), (6). 
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the input (i.e. the personal information) need not be de-identified, 
but that the output of the research must be? The clumsy drafting 
makes this a legitimate question for which there is no clear answer.   
Furthermore, one of the nine conditions in the definition of 
“research” is that the research “not [be] used for any commercial 
purpose.”77  On its face, such a condition is absurd. Taken literally, 
that means that the scientific research involving the use of personal 
information could never be used for any commercial purpose. If a 
new drug is developed from such research, it could not be produced 
or distributed by any company. If a new security method or 
technology is developed from such research, private sector entities 
could not use it to protect their data or that of their customers. If a 
new clean energy source is developed from such research, 
automakers could not incorporate it into their vehicles and 
manufacturing processes. This condition, in effect, means that the 
definition of “research” will apply to virtually no real-world 
research.   
Moreover, this condition conflicts with another definition within 
the CCPA itself. The defined term “research” is used within the 
definition of “business purpose.” Under the CCPA, “business 
purpose” means a use of personal information for certain 
“operational purposes, or other notified purposes,”78 and the 
definition provides several examples of business purposes including 
“undertaking internal research for technological development and 
demonstration.”79 So, “internal research” is a “business purpose,” 
but “research” is defined in such a way that it must be non-
commercial. But a business purpose is something carried out by a 
business, so it’s inherently commercial. Thus, this example of a 
business purpose only applies to non-commercial research carried 
out for a commercial purpose. Such conflicts make the CCPA 
definitions section remind one of a paradox Captain Kirk would give 
to a malevolent computer to make it self-destruct.80   
Needless to say, the CCPA is not the ideal model for how a 
                                                                                                             
77 Id. § 1798.140(s)(8). 
78 Id. § 1798.140(d). 
79 Id. § 1798.140(d)(6). 
80 See, e.g., the Star Trek episodes Return of the Archons (NBC television 
broadcast Feb. 9, 1967), I, Mudd (NBC television broadcast Nov. 3, 1967), and 
The Ultimate Computer (NBC television broadcast Mar. 8, 1968). 
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privacy law should define and address scientific research. The 
definition of research is unclear, contradictory, and so narrow that it 
would apply to little or no real-world research.   
Fortunately, that poorly-drafted definition appears to have little 
practical effect. The term “research” is used only twice in CCPA.   
First, it creates an exception to consumers’ right to delete personal 
information that is at best extraordinarily narrow and at worst 
nonsensical. But there are other exceptions to the right to delete that 
are extremely broad and are likely to make having to delete data 
needed for any research purposes very rare. Second, it creates a 
contradiction within the definition of “business purpose,” but which 
has little or no effect on the use or sharing or personal information 
for research purposes.   
At the end of the day, the exceedingly narrow statutory 
definition of “research” under the CCPA does not result in any 
prohibition or restriction on the use or disclosure of personal 
information for research purposes. The only case where such uses 
and disclosures would be restricted is when a disclosure is deemed 
a “sale” of personal information, a factor companies will want to 
consider and perhaps take steps to design the data sharing 
arrangement with an eye toward avoiding it being considered a sale. 
Nevertheless, the numerous problems with how the “research” 
definition is drafted could cause problems in the future if CCPA is 
ever expanded to include things like a broad consent obligation for 
data sharing, or if that definition is adopted or used in another 
context that would impose significant restrictions in data uses and 
disclosures that do not meet that definition.   
 
 
PART III: COMMERCIAL VS. ACADEMIC RESEARCH 
 
While privacy laws address and affect scientific research in 
different ways, most have some provisions that make reasonable 
allowances for research. Questions may arise regarding the 
applicability of these provisions based on the purposes and nature of 
the research being conducted. For example, where personal 
information is used for research, there are a variety of possible 
research purposes and a broad spectrum of uses ranging from the 
purely academic to the purely commercial. Some research may be 
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focused on promoting some widely–supported public interest 
objective. Some academic research may simply be aimed at 
advancing scientific knowledge.  Some may be designed to develop 
new technologies. Some may focus on developing or improving 
commercial products or services.  Some may be to study the safety 
of a product or service.  And some may be aimed at improving the 
effectiveness of information or marketing messages provided to 
consumers.   
Common sense and practical experience may lead organizations 
to conclude that regulators are likely to look more favorably upon 
research purposes that are closer to the “purely academic” end of the 
spectrum, or where a strong public benefit to the research can be 
demonstrated. And in fact, the text of several privacy laws suggests 
that lawmakers have shown a preference for research in the public 
interest. For instance, under the CCPA, the research exception to the 
right to delete requires that the research be in the public interest and 
not for commercial purposes.81 And under the GDPR, the higher 
level of restrictions on the processing of special categories of 
sensitive personal data (including health data) don’t apply where the 
“processing is necessary for reasons of public interest in the area of 
public health, such as protecting against serious cross-border threats 
to health or ensuring high standards of quality and safety of health 
care and of medicinal products or medical devices.”82 
However, it also appears that even within these laws that give 
preference to research concerning issues of general public welfare, 
the lines between academic and commercial research are not 
determinative. As noted in Part II above, the problematic CCPA 
definition that says research must be non-commercial conflicts with 
how the term “research” is used elsewhere in CCPA in a purely 
commercial context, and in any event, it has little practical effect. In 
Europe, the GDPR includes a helpful recital that says: “For the 
purposes of this Regulation, the processing of personal data for 
scientific research purposes should be interpreted in a broad manner 
including for example technological development and 
demonstration, fundamental research, applied research and privately 
                                                                                                             
81 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.105(d)(6), 1798.140(s)(8). But see the problems 
with that definition discussed in Part II. 
82GDPR, supra note 3 at 38. 
32
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol14/iss2/3
2019]  SCIENCE AND PRIVACY 135 
funded research.”83 
Thus, the conclusions regarding permissible use, sharing, and 
retention of personal information for research purposes may not be 
fundamentally different for commercial research vs. purely 
academic research under the laws addressed in this paper.84 Most 
privacy laws provide leeway to allow for use of personal 
information for scientific research, and in most or all cases, that 
leeway extends to at least some commercial research.  
That flexibility makes sense. After all, the lines between 
academic or public-interest research and commercial research often 
are not clear or obvious. Much academic research is leveraged for 
beneficial commercial applications. And often, there are close 
academic-commercial collaborations that make it possible to turn 
research into, for example, mass-market drugs. Conversely, much 
research performed by commercial entities promotes public 
interests, such as advancing scientific knowledge and furthering 
public health. Privacy law should allow for, and encourage, all such 
research. 
 
PART IV:  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
As policymakers draft new privacy laws, update existing privacy 
laws, or develop guidance applying or interpreting privacy laws, 
they must consider carefully how their laws, guidance, and 
interpretations impact scientific research. Privacy laws should allow 
for and encourage responsible use of personal information to 
advance scientific knowledge and innovation. To overly burden the 
use of personal information for research purposes is to foreclose the 
possibility of such research and the many benefits that flow from 
enabling it. 
Particularly when incorporating principles such as consent, a 
                                                                                                             
83 Id. Recital 159 at 30. 
84 It is worth noting, however, that many uses of data flowing from research 
for commercial purposes will raise additional legal obligations. For example, if 
an output of research is a better algorithm for tailoring marketing messages to 
consumers, the company wishing to send those tailored marketing messages will 
need to comply with all the legal obligations that apply to direct marketing, 
including initial consent, providing users the ability to stop receiving such 
messages at any time, etc. Thus, organizations need to be aware of the regulatory 
obligations applicable to all subsequent data uses. 
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right to delete personal information, and notions of data 
minimization, it is important that privacy laws include reasonable 
and realistic exceptions for research.  To that end, policymakers 
should adopt the following recommendations: 
 If a privacy law requires consent for certain uses or 
disclosures of personal information, there must also be 
practical alternatives to consent available.   
 If a privacy law includes a right for individuals to request the 
deletion of personal information, there must be an exception 
available if the personal information is needed for research 
purposes. 
 If a privacy law includes a collection limitation principle, 
collecting data needed for research purposes must be 
considered an appropriate ground for collecting personal 
information. 
 If a privacy law includes a retention limitation principle, 
retaining data needed for research purposes must be an 
appropriate ground for retention.     
 If a law addresses de-identification, the law should provide 
incentives for its use of rather than imposing a mandate.  
Further, such incentives should acknowledge that de-
identification may not always be appropriate or compatible 
with certain uses of personal information, including certain 
research uses. 
 Definitions of “research” and the ways the law addresses 
research uses of personal information should not limit the 
allowances for research to just “non-commercial” research, 
but should instead be flexible and acknowledge that 
commercial or privately-funded research can lead to the 
same desirable outcomes as publicly-funded or purely 
academic research.    
Making such allowances for scientific research in privacy law 
does not mean that privacy need be sacrificed. Other privacy 
principles can provide protection while still allowing for research 
uses of the data. Transparency can help create understanding of such 
uses and provide for organizational accountability. De-
identification, when appropriately applied in a manner compatible 
with the research purpose, can protect personal information and 
reduce privacy risks.   Data security is essential and can help ensure 
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that personal information in a research context is protected from 
unauthorized access and misuse.   
Existing laws, such as the GDPR, include these types of 
allowances for scientific research while still providing robust 
privacy protections. By following these recommendations, 
policymakers can strike an appropriate balance that enables and 
encourages socially beneficial uses of personal date while protecting 
the privacy of individuals.  
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